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Abstract: Financial issues are very often behind political conflicts between or within territories. 
However, conflicts are not limited to the territorial allocation of resources. Three factors 
appear to have a decisive influence: the distribution of political power between the central and 
the territorial government (federal/unitary model); the economic conception of the territory 
prevailing in central institutions (multipolar/radial conception); and the degree of territorial 
diversity and the existence of «national» minorities. The analysis of the Catalan- Spanish 
conflict along these three dimensions allows us to reach some preliminary conclusions, which 
should be tested by further empirical work. The first conclusion is that – when markedly 
opposite preferences exist between territories concerning the issue of more or less 
decentralization – the only stable agreement is some kind of specific settlement with this 
specific territory. The second conclusion is that a federal model appears to be intrinsically 
incompatible with a radial, centre-based conception of the country. 
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1. Introduction: some preliminary remarks 
Territorial conflicts and financial issues are always narrowly tied. However, even if territorial 
conflicts often derive from fierce economic controversies, it would be a very simplistic 
approach to consider that financial problems are the only, or the essential, explanation of 
political conflicts between or within territories. Usually they are complementary and there is 
some kind of interaction between them. 
The conflict between Catalonia and Spain is a very good example in this respect. When, in the 
second half of the XIX century, Catalonia emerged as a powerful industrial region leading the 
Spanish economy, a political movement of national affirmation arose with special strength: 
«Catalanism». The origin of this movement was closely associated to socio-economic factors. 
It appeared, to some extent, as a reaction of the Catalan society to the incapacity of the State 
to provide an effective response to the needs that an industrial, bourgeois and working-class 
society, as it was at that time Catalonia, required: highly qualified education, training schools, 
communication networks, railways, roads, electrification; also institutional mechanisms to 
accommodate social conflicts, instead of relying exclusively on repression. 
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In essence, «Catalanism» had, and still has, a core motivation: to achieve the political power 
needed to manage the socio-economic problems that Catalan society has to address. This is 
why, for more than 150 years, the mainstream of «Catalanism» had two basic goals: to achieve 
the self-government (and the acknowledgement of Catalonia as a nation); and to transform 
and modernise the State, making it able to provide the public goods required by an industrial 
society. 
In the short spells of autonomy and democracy before the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War (in the 
1910s and in the 1930s during the Second Republic), and especially since 1977 with the 
establishment of a democratic monarchy after the death of Franco, «Catalanist» parties 1 have 
won all the elections held in Catalonia. After Franco’s long dictatorship, the democratic 
Constitution of 1978 set up what has been called «the State of Autonomies», with the creation 
of the Autonomous Communities (ACs), an intermediate level of government with political 
power and its own legislative assembly. The acceptance of self-government by the Spanish 
Constitution was seen at that time as an historical step. 
The Constitution acknowledged an acceptable level of self-government to Catalonia, where 
«Catalanist» parties (both on the right and on the left of the political spectrum) alternate in 
ruling the regional and local governments. In a sense, the Constitution contained an implicit 
compromise: on the one hand, mainstream «Catalanist» parties renounced to secession; on 
the other hand, the main democratic Spanish political forces renounced to the «renaissance» 
of the traditional unitary state, strongly centralised and deeply impregnated of Spanish 
nationalism. 
Not without problems and conflicts, this agreement has worked for thirty years. However, it 
has recently broken down and the relationship between Catalonia and Spain is at the end of 
the cycle that started during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Many reasons 
have led to a progressive deterioration of the Constitutional agreement. The most remarkable 
one is probably the failure in approving a new «Statute of Autonomy» (the  By-Constitution of 
Catalonia) in the second half of the 2000s. At present, a large majority of Catalans does not 
consider the Constitution as the appropriate framework for self-government. Sovereignism 
occupies the mainstream of the political spectrum in Catalonia and the project of 
independence is hegemonic within the space of «Catalanism», a situation which had never 
happened in the past. 
The aim of this contribution is not to analyse the crisis in the relation Catalonia-Spain. 
Notwithstanding, this conflict provides a good case for studying the many issues that are 
involved when we examine the links between financial and political problems in territorial 
conflicts. The key point I wish to make is that both problems are closely interconnected and 
they reinforce each other: in general, societies wish to achieve more political power to manage 
socioeconomic problems but they also want to have more economic power to be politically 
stronger. 
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 For «Catalanist» parties, I mean in this paper the parties that share the essential goals of «Catalanism», 




2. Government and territory: A double level of analysis  
A territorial political community within a broader political communityhas two ways to pursue 
the own goals. The first one is self-government, i.e., to have its own government with the 
appropriate responsibilities and resources to design and implement the policies that the 
territory requires. The second one is a central government making a policy fitting the needs of 
this territory. This means that when we examine the roots of the problems or the conflicts of a 
territory within a state, it is necessary to consider both levels. This is the case of Catalonia. One 
of the main reasons that explain the origin of «Catalanism» in the XIX century, as previously 
mentioned, is the inability of the State to supply the kind of public goods and services that the 
Catalan society needed. The analysis of the economic factors underlying the current political 
conflict highlights two basic complaints. The first one is related to how the regional 
government is financed: its political capacity to decide over taxes, the total resources available 
and the degree of fiscal solidarity. However, there is also a second and very important 
complaint: the economic policy of the central government and its main economic and financial 
decisions are based on a radial, Madrid based, conception of Spain. The economic policy 
design and very relevant economic decisions are therefore not territorially neutral and are very 
often harmful for the interests of Catalonia. The potential territorial conflict of a political 
system depends on two factors: a) the distribution of political power between the different 
levels of government; b) the territorial model applied by the central government and, in 
general, the underlying territorial concept existing in the central institutions. Two aspects 
appear to be decisive when examining these factors. The first one is the political power of 
central government in relation to intermediate or regional governments. On this issue, it is 
possible to define a spectrum of possibilities, ranging from a highly centralized model (a 
unitary state with weak regional governments) to a highly decentralized one. The weaker are 
regional governments in deciding the policies according to the preferences of their territories, 
the higher the probabilities of conflict. The second factor is the territorial model adopted by 
the central government. We can define this model considering a spectrum of possibilities that 
goes from a strongly radial and centre-based model at one extreme, to a multi-polar, 
territorially neutral, network model at the other extreme. The more radial and centre-based is 
the model and the bigger is the territorial diversity, the higher is the probability of conflict. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider three essential dimensions when explaining the 
probability of a territorial conflict: the distribution of political and financial power (resources 
and responsibilities) between the different levels of government; the territorial model of 
central government; and the degree of territorial diversity. At one extreme, we could think ofa 
country characterized by strong territorial diversity and a very centralized system, even 
without intermediate governments, where all the political power is concentrated in the hand 
of the central government, but whose territorial model is very neutral. The territorial conflict 
would not be avoided, of course, because the territorial diversity could not be politically 
represented in territorial governments, but the degree of conflict would be weaker than in a 
country with a strong radial model. At the other extreme, we could think of a highly 
decentralized system, but with a central government adopting a very active centre-biased 
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territorial policy. In this case, the policies tailored to their territories by their own governments 
could be counter-balanced by the policies of central government; and the conflicto still arises. 
Now, if we interpret the Spanish case according to these three dimensions, we come to the 
following conclusions. First, there is a high territorial diversity, i.e., strong «national» 
minorities, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Second, there is a multilevel 
system, with intermediate governments, with a high level of budgetary and expenditure 
decentralization, but with a low level of political decentralization. Third, the territorial model 
of the central government is strongly radial and Madrid-centred. This is the framework that 
explains the two kinds of complaints that we mentioned at the beginning of this section: on 
the one hand, the one concerning the financing of the regional government; on the other 
hand, the one related to the territorial model of the central government.  
In the next section, I discuss the main issues related to the first complaint, while in the last 
section I develop an analytical approach to examine the stability of the political systems 
according to the three dimensions.  
3. Multilevel political system and territorial conflict: Economic and fiscal aspects  
The relationship between different levels of government in Spain provoques two essential 
kinds of conflicts. The first one, mainly a financial conflict, has to do with the funding of 
regional governments, and in this section (largely based on Castells, 2014) I examine mainly 
this point. However, there is a second economic conflict, often forgotten but very important: 
the real scope for regional government to define the policies in different areas. In different and 
very important public policy areas, there is not an exclusive allocation of responsibilities to one 
single level of government; different governments share instead, concurrently some degree of 
responsibilities with different vertical powers. For example, it is very usual that the central 
government has the power to pass framework law, and autonomous governments to pass 
«second-level» laws and exercise executive powers. Therefore, a relatively high budget does 
not necessarily translate into an equally high political decision making power.  
In a way, in many areas, the ACs have a low degree of real responsibility of a rather 
administrative (instead than political) nature. This is mostly the result of an ambiguous and 
insufficient constitutional design, but it is also the consequence of the interpretation made by 
the Constitutional Court about the room and power that the Constitution allows to ACs.  
The financing system of the Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat de Catalunya) has 
been a permanent cause of struggle between Catalonia and Spain; this is because it provides 
only a limited power to the Generalitat to decide over the taxes that are paid in Catalonia (a 
low degree of real fiscal responsibility) and also because the amount received is considered 
unsatisfactory. 
This is in turn mainly attributed to the excessive solidarity produced by a system that leads to 
over-equalization. Table 1 shows the effects of implicit and explicit equalization mechanisms 
contained in the ACs’ financing system. While Catalan citizens make a tax contribution per 
capita to the funding of all ACs that is around 20% above the average, the resources per capita 
available for the Catalan government are around the average after equalization. Catalonia is 
ranked third out of fifteen ACs in terms of tax contribution per capita (i.e., before equalization) 
and only tenth in terms of autonomous resources per capita (i.e., after equalization). This is 
the reason why many reform proposals have been made since long time ago, taking as an 
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example federal countries. The agenda of the federalist option is quite well known. Regarding 
its economic and financial aspects, it could be summed up in four main points. 
The first one is fiscal responsibility. The essential principle is that Autonomous Governments’ 
spending should be largely funded by taxes levied by these governments and not by grants 
coming from Central Government. 
In addition, they should have both normative and administrative responsibility for these taxes. 
Although it is well known that for some taxes (corporate tax, VAT) large limitations exist for 
having full fiscal responsibility, there is significant scope to improve the present situation. 
The second point is equalization. Most federal countries have explicit equalization systems. An 
explicit partial equalization mechanism was adopted in Spain in 2009. However, the reform 
was so cautious and contained so many safeguards that its effects were unsatisfactory and, as 
previously mentioned, the system produced (and still produces) a strong degree of 
overequalization. There is therefore still plenty of scope for introducing further substantial 
improvements. The third point concerns vertical fiscal imbalances between different levels of 
government, since the ratio potential revenues/expenditure needs for central government is 
much larger than for autonomous governments. A new system should involve matching 
expenditure needs with potential tax resources across all ACs. Furthermore, some regular 
mechanism should be provided for updating the balance between relative tax potential and 
relative expenditures needs of ACs and central government. 
Tab. 1. Equalization effect of the autonomous financing system in Spain* (2015) 
 Tax capacity Total revenues 
Andalusia  77.8 93.6 
Aragón  113.8 116.9 
Asturias  103.4 112.5 
Balearic Islands  121.7 98.7 
Canary Islands  41.1 91.6 
Cantabria  110.6 130.3 
Castille and Leon  98.8 116.4 
Castille Mancha  82.3 104.6 
Catalonia  118.6 98.5 
Extremadura  73.6 118.0 
Galicia  90.3 110.8 
La Rioja  103.2 123.0 
Madrid  140.6 69.0 
Murcia 82.2 93.0 
Valencia  95.5 92.1 
Total  100.0 100.0 
Note: (*) Autonomous communities average per capita = 100. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Spanish Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública. 
  
Finally, the fourth point is the participation of Autonomous Governments in decision-making 
by the State. A large part of tax and economic regulations as well as basic laws and economic 
decisions affecting autonomous responsibilities are undertaken at the central level only. The 
actual autonomy of territorial governments is limited by this constraint. In some countries, this 
imbalance is partially corrected with an upper legislative chamber (the Senate) which 
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represents territorial interests. While different implementations are possible (for example, the 
German and United States formulae are quite different), the principle is the same. Some 
attempts have been made in Spain for reforming the Senate in this way, but the results so far 
have been disappointing. 
The models of federal countries with similar political, economic and social characteristics (i.e., 
Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States; maybe also Austria, Australia and 
Belgium) are a good guide for these changes. Although these countries certainly are all very 
different in many aspects, in general terms they can provide examples on how to deal with the 
four points discussed above and to define an agenda for a federal reform of the Spanish 
Constitution. A large apparent consensus could exist on principles, less so on details and on 
their implementation. And above all, it exists in Spain a very important divide about the model 
of distribution of political power between different levels of government. This is the issue 
discussed in the next section. 
4. Two conceptions about the territorial distribution of political power 
Underlying the territorial conflict in Spain there are two opposite conceptions about the crucial 
issue of the distribution of political power between different levels of government (this section 
is partially based on Castells, 2017). According to a unitary conception, the whole political 
power is concentrated in one level of government only, the central government. There are, of 
course, many different unitary states, with very different degrees of decentralization. Nordic 
countries, for instance, have powerful local governments responsible for providing essential 
public services. But they have administrative, not political power, always concentrated in the 
hands of central government. Incidentally, secessionist proposals share, in some way, this 
conception of the territorial distribution of political power. They will also concentrate this 
power in the territorial government that would become, when independent, also a central 
government. By the contrary, according to a federal conception, the political power is shared 
between different levels of government. De facto, federal systems are based on the notion of 
shared sovereignty. The tension between «sharedrule » and «self-rule», between equality and 
freedom, is inherent to these political systems. There is always a «trade-off» between the two 
basic goals of freedom (autonomy) and equality. It would be impossible to have full equality 
among all citizens in the country (which is the «holy goal» of a unitary state) without sacrificing 
the autonomy of the intermediate governments. 
And it will be impossible to accept the full autonomy of territorial governments 
(i.e.,independence) without fully sacrificing the goal of equality. This is why the stability of a 
federation crucially depends on its ability to find the right balance between these two goals; in 
institutional terms, between «shared-rule» and «self-rule». 
These two different conceptions of the distribution of political power have a direct translation 
to the field of the financing system of territorial governments. The first one leads directly to 
the conclusion that the taxation power relies almost exclusively on the central government. 
According to this idea, there is no more than one fiscal relationship: the one that citizens in 
any region hold with the central power, which defines the essential elements of the taxes, and 
applies those elements according to a principle of equality among all citizens. According to this 
conception, there are only two relevant issues regarding the ACs’ financing: first, determining 
what portion of the total resources (derived, in essence, of course, from state taxation) goes to 
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the central government and what portion goes to the governments of the ACs; and, second, 
establishing criteria for the further allocation to each AC. 
According to the opposite conception, territorial governments have political power. In fiscal 
terms, what defines a democratic government is that it collects taxes from the citizens, in 
order to provide them services, and that only the citizens under its jurisdiction decide on both 
essential questions. In a federal system this basic principle applies to every level of 
government, each one within their specific jurisdiction. All governments have fiscal 
responsibility. 
The citizens involved in the respective jurisdiction decide which mix of taxes and services 
better fits their own preferences. In general, in a politically integrated system (i.e., in a federal 
state) this basic principle has two important limits. Firstly, there is no full fiscal sovereignty for 
intermediate governments (and often neither for the central government), because market 
integration requires some kind of fiscal integration. Secondly, federal systems have often 
explicit or implicit equalization mechanisms between territories; and these mechanisms are 
possible only if a shared feeling of being part of the same political community exists. 
Therefore, different visions of financing regional governments strongly depend on these two 
conceptions of the distribution of political power. Either of the two models can prove 
satisfactory if there is a broad political and territorial consensus as to which is preferred. This is 
what happens in many federal and unitary countries. However, it may occur that such a 
consensus is not forthcoming. When disagreement is more or less homogeneous across all the 
territories that make up the political community (i.e., the preferences for one or the other 
model are relatively similar across different territories), there are only two possible ways out: 
a) the imposition of one model at the expense of the other, with the obvious ensuing tensions 
and instability; b) the adoption of a hybrid model resulting from a combination of the two 
models. This is not a tragedy: between a «pure» unitary model and a «pure» federal model, 
there is a large spectrum of possibilities from which to choose. 
However, when the lack of consensus can be clearly delimited in geographical terms (i.e., in 
some regions there is a clear preference for one model and in other regions for the other), 
then the possibility of adopting specific solutions in certain regions could be an optimal 
solution and should be considered. In short, this is what has happened in more than one 
country (Scotland in the UK; Quebec in Canada; Flanders in Belgium) when this problem has 
occurred, and it has served to maintain the stability of theunion and to reduce calls for 
independence. And, above all, it has served tosatisfy the aspirations of different regions that 
also have different preferences as to how political power should be shared between the 
common government and self-government. Apparently, this could be the case for Spain in 
relation to the Catalan conflict, although the possibility of a specific deal for Catalonia has 
always been dismissed by the main Spanish political parties2. I come back again to this point 
below. 
 
                                                          
2
 The map of political parties is very different in Catalonia and the Basque Country compared with the 
rest of Spain. Popular Party and Socialist Party, the two biggest parties in Spain (and overwhelmingly 
hegemonic for more than forty years), are currently only the fifth and the third, respectively, in the 
Catalan Parliament, where they have together the 20% of total seats. In the Basque Parliament, they 
are, respectively, the fifth and the fourth parties, and have jointly the 24% of the seats. 
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5. Constitutional design, market integration and the limits of sovereignty 
The Constitution is the benchmark that includes the design of institutions, the rules that define 
the distribution of power between the different levels of government and the rules on how to 
share that power. As discussed at length in Castells (2013), the constitutional definition and 
design are therefore crucial: the allocation of responsibilities and resources between the 
different levels of governments, and their effective quality (the real power they allow); the 
specification of the two limits I have mentioned, fiscal sovereignty and equalization. The 
constitutional design will be usually a key factor to determine the stability of a country or, on 
the contrary, to incentive polarization between centrifugal and centripetal forces. 
One especially relevant problem arises when there are «national minorities », which means 
that there is a regional diversity located in some specific territories, while a strong uniformity 
characterises all the other ones. In this case, two constitutional points are decisive: firstly, how 
far the constitutional rules are open to interpretation concerning the protection of «national 
minorities »; secondly, how difficult is to reform the Constitution. The more open to 
interpretation are the rules, the easier it is that – once the Constitution has been approved – 
the majority will adopt a restrictive interpretation unfavourable for «national minorities». On 
the contrary, when the Constitution is less open to interpretation and with reduced leeway for 
reforming, these minorities are more protected. 
Another essential issue is the real scope of fiscal sovereignty. Since the possibility of achieving 
fiscal sovereignty is often mentioned as an important potential benefit for a seceding country, 
it is needed to analyse the real net gains from full independence against the gains obtainable 
from being an intermediate state in a federal system. The crucial point is that economic 
integration places severe restrictions to the autonomy of politics. The effectiveness of many 
public policies (either regulatory, services provision, macroeconomic or tax policies) crucially 
depends on how far the territory where market activity extends its effects exceeds the 
boundaries of governments.  
Market integration without political integration usually leads to the progressive irrelevance of 
public policies. This conclusion applies both to intermediate governments in a federal state 
(and, often, also to federal government) and to the governments of small independent 
countries (and, also, very often, to not so small countries). Neither the intermediate 
governments of a federal state nor the governments of independent countries have full 
political sovereignty when compared to the power of markets that exceed their boundaries. 
There is an obvious direct correlation between the loss of political sovereignty and the degree 
of market integration. Stronger market integrationmakes less likely to have real fiscal 
sovereignty for governments whose territorial jurisdictions are smaller than the territory 
where market decisions extend their effects. In this case, only by sharing political power 
through an upper level of government it is possible to have effective political power. 
  
6. «National» minorities, opposite territorial preferences and constitutional design: Some 
elements for analysing the conflict Catalonia/Spain   
We now have some additional elements for analysing the conflict Catalonia/Spain. Spain is a 
very clear example of a country where the preferences for the two models (federal/unitary) 
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are markedly opposite between the different territories. While in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country there is an overwhelming majority that wish more autonomy (and, a relevant part, 
also political independence), in the rest of Spain there is a majority that feels good with the 
current situation or even would approve a more centralized system (even without any kind of 
autonomy). The Tables 2 and 3 show very interesting figures in relation to this point: 
i) 45.9% of citizens in Catalonia feel themselves exclusively Catalan or more Catalan 
than Spanish, while in the rest of Spain the same percentage (changing Catalonia 
for the corresponding region) falls to 11.2% (see Table2). On the contrary, 12.6% 
of citizens in Catalonia feel themselves exclusively Spanish or more Spanish than 
Catalan, while in the rest of Spain this percentage is 25.0%. These percentages 
would be even lower (higher, respectively) excluding the Basque Country from the 
rest of Spain, where the figures are similar to Catalonia. 
ii) ii) 63.3% of population in Catalonia wishes more decentralization (an independent 
state, a federal state or more autonomy in the current system of ACs) (see Table 3 
panels B and C), while in the rest of Spain the percentage falls to 18.1%. On the 
contrary, while in Spain the 33.9% of population prefers less autonomy (including 
no autonomy at all) (Table 3 panels A and C), in Catalonia this percentage is only 
5.8%. The same considerations onexcluding the Basque Country apply also in this 
case.  
These figures show a sharp asymmetry between models of political power distribution desired 
in different territories. While in Catalonia and the Basque Country there is a clear preference 
for a strong decentralization (even independence), in the rest of Spain there is a majority 
which rather prefers a unitary (and even a more centralized) State. The 1978 democratic 
Constitution tried to acknowledge this very asymmetric reality, establishing two different 
categories of autonomy and distinguishing between «nationalities » and regions. But this 
distinction was very quickly watered down, with the generalization and homogenization policy 
applied already in the 1980’s (the «café para todos», «coffee for everybody», policy 3) to all 
ACs, except 3 the Basque Country (where a specific framework is established in the 
Constitution). 
At that time, a kind of hybrid between unitary and federal model was created. However, this 
hybrid model did fit neither the preferences of Catalonia (that hoped for a more decentralized 
model), nor the preferences of the rest of Spain, which desired a less decentralized model. 
Incidentally, this allows to draw an interesting conclusion: a hybrid/blended model could be a 
good solution when the preferences for one or the other model are homogenously spread 
across all the country, but not when they are very polarized between territories. 
This hybrid has shown to be not a stable solution and, over time, it has slowly evolved into a 
rather unitary, low quality decentralized model. Somehow, the more unitary preference 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that, after the decision of the Spanish government on October 21, 
2017 (that was ratified by the Senate on October 27), suspending the Catalan autonomy, 




shared by the majority in the rest of Spain was applied everywhere, including Catalonia, where 
there is a clear preference for a more decentralized model (Tables 2 and 3). A second  
interesting conclusion is therefore that when the constitutional framework is ambiguous, i.e., 
it allows a wide room for interpretation, the initial compromise set up in the Constitution 
protecting the «national» minorities may progressively weaken, according to the preferences 
of the «national» majority. This leads to a very unstable scenario, with the radicalization of the 
conflict and the rise of secessionism. 
Tab. 2. Sense of nationhood in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain (%) 
 Spain Catalonia Rest of Spain 
Only Spanish 15.6 7.6 17.1 
More Spanish than Catalan/Regional* 7.4 5.0 7.9 
Stronger Spanish feeling 23.0 12.6 25.0 
As Spanish as Catalan/Regional* 53.8 36.7 57.1 
More Catalan/Regional* than Spanish 10.6 22.6 8.3 
Only Catalan 6.2 23.3 2.9 
Stronger Catalan/Regional* feeling 16.8 45.9 11.2 
Others 6.4 4.8 6.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* In the rest of Spain, corresponding region. 
Source: CIS (2017, 17), CEO (2017, 54). 
Tab. 3. Preferences about the territorial model in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain 
 
A Spain (preferences) (%) 
Only a Central Government without autonomies 18.9 
Autonomous Communities with less autonomy 10.5 
Autonomous Communities with the present level of autonomy 36.8 
Autonomous Communities with more autonomy 15.8 





Source: CIS (2017, 17). 
 
B Catalonia (preferences: «Catalonia should be») (%) 
A region of Spain 7.0 
An Autonomous Community within Spain 28.5 
A State within a Spanish Federal State 21.7 
An independent State 37.3 
Others 5.5 
Total 100.0 
Source: CEO (2017, 59). 
 
C Degree of decentralization (preferences) (%) 
 Spain Catalonia Rest of Spain 
More decentralization 25.4 63.3 18.1 
Present decentralization 36.8 25.5 39.0 
Less decentralization 29.4 5.8 33.9 
Others 8.4 5.4 9.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 




An overall conclusion, taking Catalonia as a case study, is that when very sharp differences 
exist between the territories concerning the preferences for a federal or a unitary model, the 
only stable solution is to reach some kind of bi-lateral, specific, settlement with this territory. 
On the contrary, the implementation of a uniform and generalised formula presents two big 
problems: first, it fits neither the «national» majority nor the «national» minority preferences; 
second, over time this formula may very easily evolve into a clearly unitary and more 
centralized model according to the preferences of the majority. This evolution could be 
mitigated if, on the one hand, the constitutional rules protecting the minority rights were 
clearly established and, on the other hand, it was very difficult to change these rules. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case of Spain.  
 
7. Final comments: Conflict and stability in different models of territorial distribution of 
political power 
When analysing the potential territorial conflict of a political system it is necessary to consider 
three main variables: the distribution of political power in a multilevel system; the territorial 
conception of the central government; and the degree of territorial diversity.  
First, we have to assess which is the distribution of political power between different levels of 
government. Related to this point, we can consider a spectrum of possibilities ranging from a 
highly decentralized system (pure federal system), where territorial governments have full 
responsibility in the main fields of public activity, to highly centralized system (pure unitary 
system), where all the political power is concentrated in the hands of central government. 
Within both models, we could consider an additional sub variable, depending on the presence 
of bilateral agreements between the central government and some specific territory. 
Second, it is necessary to consider the territorial conception of the central government (and, in 
general, of central institutions). Related to this point, we can define a spectrum ranging from a 
highly centralist system (pure radial model), to a neutral, multi-polar system (neutral model). 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the degree of regional diversity between the different 
territories. In particular, we have to assess if there exist very marked «national» minorities.  
In this section, I, firstly, propose a classification of models combining in a binary way each one 
of these three dimensions and then suggest real country examples for each of the eight 
resulting types; and secondly, I make some final considerations over the stability of different 
models and their potential risk of generating conflict.  
According to the three dimensions described above, we could obtain eight territorial models: 
I. Federal/Neutral/No «national» minorities (USA, Germany, Australia) 
II. Federal/Neutral/«National» minorities (Belgium, Canada, Switzerland) 
III. Federal/Radial/No «national» minorities (not found?) 
IV. Federal/Radial/«National» minorities (not found/Spain?) 
V. Unitary/Neutral/No «national» minorities (not found?) 
VI. Unitary/Neutral/«National» minorities (UK? Italy?) 
VII. Unitary/Radial/No «national» minorities (France) 




The allocation of countries made to these eight «archetypal» models is, obviously, an 
oversimplification. It should be considered strictly as an example. In reality, there are not 
«archetypical» cases but rather «hybrids» combining elements of different models. Therefore, 
the allocation to one precise category is based on its clear predominance. I believe necessary 
to specify three points concerning this exercise: first, I include in the classification only 
advanced countries, with a large common base of similar political, social and economic 
characteristics. Second, I consider as «national» minorities the standard cases, where there are 
strong territorial parties and cultural and linguistic differences. Should Bavaria be included in 
this category, Germany would move from model I to model II. Third, some countries (Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom) are included in different categories or with a question mark, 
because their allocation is not unambiguous. Spain, as I mentioned above, is really a hybrid 
between the unitary and the federal model. The United Kingdom is a unitary state that 
recognizes «national» minorities, which enjoy wide autonomy. 
This is why it would be very simplistic to include it only in category VIII. Finally, also the Italian 
case is likely to be a hybrid in the three dimensions considered. It is a «soft» unitary state, with 
«soft» «national» minorities, and it is  «softly» neutral concerning the territorial conception. 
This classification leads to some very preliminary remarks about the compatibility of the 
different combination of dimensions and the viability of the different resulting models. 
Apparently, two important conclusions arise. The first one is that federal models appear 
incompatible with a radial conception of the national territory. There are no examples of 
federal countries with a radial, centre-based model (Austria is an exception for very particular 
reasons, and it has not been included in the sample). In my view, if Washington were New York 
(or Los Angeles, or Chicago), United States could not be a federal state; the same is true for 
Canada if Ottawa were Toronto (or Montreal, or Vancouver); and Australia if Canberra were 
Sidney (or Melbourne). This is because the central government would not have been a neutral 
actor in the competition between territories for leading, in the many and complex fields where 
that happens, the national economy. Symmetrically to this conclusion, it appears, in general, 
that unitary models are associated with a radial  conception of the territory. United Kingdom 
could be a special case, as better understood after considering the second relevant conclusion. 
The second relevant conclusion is that institutional design is adapted to the existence of 
«national» minorities, through specific or bilateral deals when they are highly concentrated in 
only one part of the country (Quebec in Canada, Scotland in United Kingdom) or via a more 
general institutional mechanism when they are spread across the country (Switzerland, 
Belgium). This is why the case of the United Kingdom is very special: even if it were considered 
a radial model, the nations, and peculiarly Scotland, enjoy a special deal that allows a high and 
differentiated degree of autonomy; and partially counterbalance the potential effects of a 
radial model very focused on London.  
Spain is a very special hybrid of unitary and federal system, with a radial model and «national» 
minorities, in the case of Catalonia without any kind of specific deal4. This is an explosive 
blend, with no analogies in other countries, as we are recently experiencing. Firstly, because 
federalism and radial model do not match very well, they are not a stable combination, and 
                                                          
4
 This is not the case for the Basque Country, where a specific framework is established in the 
Constitution, especially concerning the finances of the Basque Government 
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the consequence is a clear trend toward a low quality, unitary biased, decentralized system. 
Secondly, the Catalan «national» minority does not have a specific acknowledgement in the 
institutional design. Both problems interconnect if we take into account that there is a sharp 
asymmetry between the preferences for a more federal or a more unitary model in Catalonia 
and in the rest of the country, respectively. 
To sum up, I should stress the close relationship between economic and political issues in 
territorial conflicts, particularly within a state. These conflicts take very often an economic or 
financial expression, though there are usually powerful underlying political factors. Some of 
them are particularly relevant: the distribution of political power between the different levels 
of government; the existence of «national» minorities; the constitutional design; and the 
territorial conception of central institutions.  
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